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American Agriculture in an
Uncertain Global Economy
Willard W. Cochrane
During the 20th century, America
had four basic policy goals for the food
and agricultural sector: 1) producing an
abundant supply of food, at reasonable
prices, for the nation; 2) assuring a pros-
perous and productive economic climate
for farmers; 3) maintaining the family
farm as the basic unit of production in
the food-supply chain; and 4) promoting
a high quality of life for all individuals
living in rural areas. How well did we
do? The first goal was achieved rela-
tively easily because the U.S. enjoys an
abundance of resources and has led the
world in developing scientific and tech-
nological innovations to increase
agricultural production.
The second goal, however, met with
much less success because the food-
producing industry is inherently
unstable. The main economic explana-
tion for this instability is that the
aggregate demand for food—in the short
run at least—and the aggregate supply of
basic food products are highly inelastic.
Thus, any small shift either in the aggre-
gate demand or supply of food products
leads to a large price response, up or
down—with a consequent change in
farm incomes. A variety of factors, such
as war, peace, long-term droughts, or
major technological breakthroughs, con-
tinuously shift the aggregate demand or
supply of food. As a result, the food-
producing industry cannot, and will not,
level off at some desirable economic
level and stay there. Economic forces—
especially inelastic aggregate demand
and inelastic aggregate supply—won’t
let it.
Other major sources of the food
system’s instability during the past 70
years were the government’s farm-sup-
port programs; notably, price support,
deficiency payments, and acreage con-
trols. These lacked the capacity and, in
many cases, the appropriate design to
cope with the great downward swings in
farm prices—some of which were gener-
ated by a faltering aggregate demand
and others by a surging aggregate sup-
ply. For example, it took the mammoth
programs of World War II, and the once-
in-a-lifetime increase in the demand for
farm products that these programs cre-
ated, to pull the farm sector out of the
deep depression of the 1930s.
In the 1960s, however, farmers and
their political leaders rejected the idea of
turning the food-producing industry into
a government-managed monopoly or
public utility as a way of coping with the
unruly shifts in aggregate demand and
supply. Perhaps that was the proper
(See Agriculture on page 2)
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The Economics of Windbreak
Renovation
Mamane Annou and Glenn Pederson
Farmers and others who remember
the Dust Bowl in the 1930s may still
have a high regard for field wind-
breaks—rows of trees and shrubs
planted to control wind damage. In the
1930s, new windbreaks were established
throughout the northern Great Plains to
reduce soil loss and improve soil pro-
ductivity. Today, about 54,000 miles of
these windbreaks remain in Minnesota,
North Dakota, and South Dakota, but
that number is steadily declining. Of this
total, Minnesota accounts for only 5,000
miles, located primarily in the Red River
Valley. All other states combined have
42,000 miles of windbreaks.
Windbreaks have multiple uses and
provide multiple private and social ben-
efits. They protect field crops during the
growing season, enhance moisture by
controlling snow distribution, and pro-
vide a habitat for wildlife. In addition,
windbreaks provide attractive landscapes
in rural areas.
Field windbreaks, however, are
costly to establish, and equally costly to
maintain and renovate. Windbreaks are
becoming less effective at sheltering
crops and controlling moisture because
older windbreaks are losing trees that are
not being replaced. For example, a sur-
vey conducted in 1979 found that 21
percent of windbreaks needed renova-
tion and that, among windbreaks that
were over 50 years old, one out of two
were being removed and would not be
replaced. Based on a similar survey done
in 1992, we estimate that 70–90 percent
of windbreaks in North and South Da-
kota need renovation.
For more than 60 years, government
programs encouraged the planting of
windbreaks by sharing the costs of ac-
quiring and planting new trees.
Currently, the Environmental Quality
Incentive Program (EQIP) and the Stew-
ardship Incentive Program (SIP) are the
most comprehensive subsidy programs2
decision at the time for the nation. But,
once again in 1999, falling global de-
mand for U.S. agricultural products has
pushed the food-producing industry into
a depression.
Maintaining the Family Farm
Efforts to achieve the third farm
policy goal have met with even less suc-
cess. The total number of farms in the
U.S. declined from 6.5 million in 1935
to 2 million in 1997. Most of this huge
decline took place among family farms.
Moreover, even the 2 million figure is an
overstatement, because 1.3 million
“farms” (or about 63 percent of the
present day total) are limited-resource,
residential, or retirement farms—leaving
approximately 700,000 actively man-
aged farms in the nation. Since 1935,
therefore, the nation has lost 4.5 million
farms, most of which were family farms.
Today there are about 540,000 small- to
medium-sized family farms and 160,000
large farms struggling to survive in the
midst of a farm depression. How did this
happen? There are a variety of causal
explanations. Certainly, some farmers
fell by the wayside because they were
poor managers, but does that explain a
net loss of 4.5 million farms? I think not.
Three factors explain these changes.
First, the roller-coaster-like behavior that
the farm sector experienced in the 20th
century caught many farmers in exposed
financial positions and, as a result, many
were forced out of business when their
product prices fell sharply. Families just
getting started in farming and those en-
gaged in expanding their operations
were especially vulnerable.
Second, farm programs, which were
put in place to help family farmers, in
fact, contributed to the demise of many
of them. These support programs pro-
vided income or price support depending
on the number of units that a farmer
produced, and the more a farmer pro-
duced, the more price or income support
he or she received. As a result, the
strong became stronger and the weak
became weaker—until the weakest
dropped out of farming.
And third, the rush to adopt modern
technology forced many farmers out of
business—particularly the smaller ones,
or those on the financial edge. Much of
the new mechanical technology was not
size neutral, because large tractor hook-
ups required large acreages over which
to spread the huge costs of such hookups
and thereby gain economic efficiencies
from adopting them. The adoption of
large, expensive machines pushed farm-
ers in the direction of acquiring more
land—but where could they get it? From
their smaller neighbors, of course. And
even size-neutral technologies like new
and improved seeds put additional finan-
cial burdens on the farmer to purchase
seeds—and the fertilizer and the herbi-
cides to go along with the new seeds. As
a result, the costs of planting a crop of
corn skyrocketed from 1950 to 1999,
which caused many farmers on the fi-
nancial edge to sell out to their more
successful and aggressive neighbors.
Where Agriculture Stands
Today
Today, a small number of very large
farmers produce about two-thirds of the
nation’s grain, livestock, fruit, and veg-
etables. The remaining third is produced
by small- to medium-sized family farm-
ers, who are struggling to survive. I say
“struggling to survive” because smaller
farmers do not have access to the favor-
able rates of short-term credit and
long-term capital enjoyed by large, cor-
porate farmers. In addition, small
farmers are excluded from using the
latest products of the biotechnology
industry—such as genetically modified
seed—unless they enter into production
contracts with the agribusiness firms that
supply these technologies. Such
changes, and the farm depression of the
1990s, I believe, will continue to put
family farmers out of business.
Rural Communities Decline as Family
Farmers Go Under
It is questionable whether the quality
of life in rural areas has improved over
the past 100 years. Certainly the poorest
of the poor still remain out there—in
small rural towns, in backwater agricul-
tural areas, and in immigrant labor
camps. Federal governmental efforts to
aid these people have been minimal, and
even those efforts have been opposed by
conservative farm organizations. But
probably the most important negative
factor has been the decline in the number
of family farms, and decimation of the
human population in the countryside. As
farm families have disappeared, so has
the support for small towns and the ser-
vices they provided such as health,
educational, shopping, and repair ser-
vices. In many farming areas,
neighborhood activities have simply
disappeared with the people.
Current Trends in U.S. Agriculture
In commercial agriculture today, two
developments are creating problems for
family farmers—and the outcome of
these developments will determine their
fate.
The first problem is the continuing
struggle, which is often minimized by
economists, over who controls the use of
productive resources on farms. Do fam-
ily farmers or multinational corporations
control these resources? The outcome of
this struggle will determine whether
there are any independent family farmers
left in the year 2010.
The second problem is the continu-
ing price-income crisis, which will
determine whether family farmers re-
main in business or go under in the next
few years. Both of these problems, al-
though different in nature, will have a
similar consequence for the family
farmer.
Farms Are Growing Larger
and More Industrialized
Since the 1970s, the productive re-
sources of the food-producing industry
have become concentrated in a relatively
small number of large, corporate farms.
These farms are characterized, as a gen-
eral rule, by the following features:
 inputs are strictly controlled with
the aid of computer technology;
 the farms are usually tied by con-
tract, either to an input-providing
agribusiness or processing firm,
both of which make important busi-
ness decisions for the farmer;
 the farms use factory-like conditions
to boost production—particularly in
the livestock industry.
All of these trends are taking place in
a rapidly changing and often unpredict-
able global economy. In my view,
farming is not farming anymore because
food production is now an industrialized
business in which important operating
decisions are made by agribusiness ex-
ecutives and not by local farmers
themselves.
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I strongly believe that with the in-
creased use of contracts, patents, and
financial controls, the food-production
sector is being converted into a poorly
understood area of monopolistic-compe-
tition. Moreover, continued develop-
ments in this direction could have dire
consequences for both farmers and con-
sumers alike.
Fewer Buyers and Suppliers
Are Creating an Oligopoly
Another trend in today’s food-pro-
duction industry is the reduced number
and increased size of the corporations in
each segment of the industry. As a re-
sult, the market power of the corpora-
tions that remain is increasing. In the
past, most agricultural research was con-
ducted by small groups scattered across
the nation in universities, federal gov-
ernment, and midsized agricultural
firms. Today, however, much agricul-
tural research is done by large, multi-
national corporations, which allows
them to create product monopolies.
At the input supply level an oligopolistic
structure is the norm. For most nonfarm
produced inputs (for example, herbicides
and farm machinery), a few large firms
supply most of the products. In addition,
at the handling and processing level,
local farmers find few local buyers for
their products. And at the retail level, the
distribution and sale of food products is
concentrated in a relatively few very
large chains such as Kroger, Albertsons,
Wal-Mart, Safeway, and Ahold, which
are responsible for 40 percent of all re-
tail food sales in the U.S.
Small Farmers Have Little
Power in the Market
Only at the farmer-producer level do
we find the classic atomistic market
structure—that is, a situation where each
seller is so small relative to the whole
market, that he or she can have no ap-
preciable effect on price. As a result the
typical farmer-producer has no market
power. At the input supply level, mo-
nopolists or oligopolists set the price on
their product that best suits their long-
run needs—and the farmer-producer can
take it or leave it. Similarly, at the
handler/processor level, monopolists or
oligopolists set the price they will pay—
and the farmer-producer, again, can take
it or leave it.
Big Corporations Are
Destroying the Small Farmer
Today, many suppliers of farm inputs
enjoy near monopolies (and conse-
quently, high prices) for their products,
which is putting many small family
farmers out of business. With the current
move against monopolies in other indus-
tries (for example, the recent court
proceedings against Microsoft), I sug-
gest the Justice Department form a
special unit in the monopolies division
to investigate the monopolies that are
being formed in the agricultural indus-
try. Monopolies, however, are not the
only problem; the very bigness of big
business creates a problem in itself.
Bigness is the problem—and the power
that bigness brings with it.
Introduce a giant corporation provid-
ing a commonly used farm input into a
local farming community, and it will
have an advantage in every transaction,
or activity, that it enters into—from fix-
ing terms with a local farmer, to
obtaining a tax-free site from the local
government on which to locate its plant,
to squeezing its local competitors. The
power such a corporation wields will
often disrupt and overwhelm the local
business environment.
Global Demand for Food Is
Highly Inelastic
Are other factors contributing to the
decline of the family farmer? One factor
that is undoubtedly causing the family
farmer problems is the inelastic nature of
the world’s demand for food.
The global market for food products
is a closed system with a given popula-
tion distribution, a given income
distribution, a given set of national laws
and rules, and a given set of human
tastes and preferences. Taking account
of these givens, there exists at any point
in time a global demand for food prod-
ucts. This concept may be difficult to
measure, but it is real and is highly in-
elastic. Global demand for food is highly
inelastic because the stomach of each
individual in the world can only take in a
finite amount of food.
The continuing increase in world
production of food products in recent
years, in combination with the erratic
shifts in the severely inelastic global
demand for those products, has led to
disastrously low prices for those prod-
ucts—and business failure for many
American farmers. It should be noted,
however, that all food product prices
will not rise or fall in lock step; the ma-
jor products most directly affected by
developments in the global economy
will lead the way, and the pricing behav-
ior of those products will spread to other
products through the ubiquitous substitu-
tion process in the global market system.
As suggested above, both the global
demand for food products and the aggre-
gate supply of those products will
continue to expand as populations and
national economies grow. Supply and
demand, however, are unlikely to grow
at the same pace because the underlying
factors that affect each are different.
Population growth and income growth
are the principal determinants of de-
mand, while climate change, new
research, new technologies, and spend-
ing on capital items (such as irrigation
systems) are leading determinants of
supply.
Thus, it seems likely that, on occa-
sions, aggregate global supplies of food
products will push ahead of aggregate
demand, which will cause farm prices to
fall sharply. On other occasions, aggre-
gate demand will push ahead of
aggregate supply, causing farm prices to
shoot skyward. Whenever either happens
(and I believe both will happen fre-
quently), consumers can expect food
prices to change—and change
dramatically.
Food prices can change dramatically
as a result of the interaction between a
severely inelastic global demand for
food products and an unpredictable ag-
gregate supply of those products within
the global economy. Consumers will
continue to experience severe changes in
food prices as long as humankind influ-
ences the nature and slope of the
aggregate demand curve for food prod-
ucts. Thus, food producers, both large
and small, would be wise to recognize
that theirs is a high-risk industry. Do-
mestic policies can mitigate the impacts




History tells us that boom times are
the dangerous times for farmers. During
(See Agriculture on page 4)4
such periods, producers tend to get car-
ried away; they expand their operations
with generous applications of credit and
forget that boom times have always been
followed by hard times—times when
those who have over-extended their
credit, unfortunately, go broke.
Agriculture is a high-risk, unpredict-
able, and unstable industry. What can
family farmers do? Fold their tents and
steal away into the night? There is, I
believe, another option. They could form
a national association—call it the
National Trade Association of Family
Farmers (NTAFF).
A powerful trade association of fam-
ily farmers could achieve some
important objectives. A newly formed
NTAFF could
 bargain with Congress for new farm
legislation that favors small farms
and reduces the amount of support
that goes currently to corporate
farms,
 bargain with state governments to
implement favorable tax provisions
for family farmers,
 bargain with suppliers for the kinds
of inputs that meet the requirements
of small family farmers,
 negotiate contracts with suppliers
that benefit family farmers such as
giving them access to the same dis-
counts enjoyed by corporate
farmers, and
 bargain with handlers and proces-
sors to find new market outlets and
buyers for the products of the family
farm.
Trade associations have worked well
for other sectors of the agricultural in-
dustry. Sugar beet growers, cotton
producers, and wheat farmers have all
formed trade associations that clearly
benefited members. A strong trade asso-
ciation of family farmers would give
them real market power and real politi-
cal power. By organizing, family
farmers could once again become a
vital—and thriving—part of our nation’s
economy.
Willard W. Cochrane is a professor
emeritus with the Department of Applied
Economics at the University of
Minnesota.
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available to farmers who elect to invest
in their windbreaks. Under EQIP, a vol-
untary program that promotes the
environmental benefits of conservation
projects including windbreak renovation,
successful applicants receive 75 percent
of renovation costs, up to $10,000 per
applicant per year. SIP, which encour-
ages conservation practices that enhance
wildlife habitat, increase recreation op-
portunities, or increase the supply of
forest products, provides for a refund of
50–75 percent of the cost of windbreak
renovation.
But, even with this level of assis-
tance, does it make financial sense for a
farmer to restore field windbreaks?
Based on the costs of renovation and the
cost-sharing incentives that are currently
available, we evaluated representative
windbreak renovation plans from the
perspective of a farmer or other land-
owner. Conceptually, the decision to
renovate a field windbreak is a capital
investment decision (much like other
farm improvements). Thus, we use a
discounted net present value (NPV) ap-
proach to identify the factors that might
inhibit farmers from renovating their
windbreaks.
Deciding Whether and How
to Renovate
In our stylized decision environment,
we assume that the farmer’s objective is
to choose the renovation plan that maxi-
mizes the NPV of private net benefits.
Similarly, society seeks to maximize the
social net benefits of field windbreaks
and encourages renovation by providing
technical assistance and funding pro-
grams that extend cost-share payments
to participating farmers. (We assume
that the social benefits have already been
determined to be sufficient to justify the
cost-share subsidy in the first place.)
A farmer may decide to either reno-
vate the windbreak or do nothing (that
is, abandon it). The farmer’s decision to
renovate requires that he or she identi-
fies the NPV of each renovation
plan—subject to budget constraints.
Because the alternative plans are mutu-
ally exclusive, the standard investment
decision rule is to select the windbreak
renovation plan that generates the high-
est positive NPV.
The cost of renovation depends on,
to a significant degree, the initial physi-
cal characteristics of the existing
windbreak, the desired level of protec-
tion, and the provisions of the cost-share
program. We identified four categories
of incremental cost associated with the
decision to renovate:
 the cost of clearing away the old
rows of trees,
 the cost of planting new trees,
 the cost of maintaining the new
windbreak, and
 the opportunity cost of the land on
which the windbreak is located.
Clearing consists of removing the
decayed rows of trees, disposing of the
debris, and leveling the site. Planting
includes the selection of tree species and
spacing specifications to achieve the
desired density of vegetation in the
windbreak. And once planted, trees may
require periodic maintenance such as
pruning. A good renovation plan may
include costs associated with using plas-
tic to conserve moisture and herbicide to
control weeds in the rows. With the ex-
ception of herbicide treatments, farmers
typically contract out the renovation
work, and many farmers apply for cost-
share payments.
If a loan is obtained to finance the
renovation, the interest cost is part of the
cost of renovation. Noncash expenses
are also typically incurred. For example,
farmers are prohibited from cropping the
area devoted to the new windbreak.
Thus, the value of foregone production
is an opportunity cost (assuming that
crop production is the next-best use of
the land).
On the benefit side, farmers expect
that, by protecting crops, windbreaks
will lead to an increase in crop yields in
adjoining fields. Faster tree growth pro-
vides earlier crop protection—and
higher yields. The expected increase in
crop yields and the area protected by the
windbreak combine to generate a stream
of private benefits (positive net cash
flows) that enter into the decision to
renovate.
While a renovation project involves
immediate cash outlays, most of the
benefits are realized only in the future.
Thus, it is important that we discount all
the costs and benefits to a reference
point in time (such as today) in order to
determine the NPV of each renovation5
plan. Once all the alternative plans are
expressed in these terms, the farmer can
select and implement the renovation plan
that achieves the highest positive value.
Generally, cost-share programs are
intended to promote renovation plans
that produce environmental benefits. By
reducing out-of-pocket costs, cost-shar-
ing programs improve the NPV of a
windbreak and make its renovation more
attractive to the farmer. It also induces
the adoption of renovation plans that are
assumed to be socially desirable. (Cost-
share programs would be inefficient, of
course, if the subsidy exceeds the social
benefits of renovation. Alternatively, if
the cost-share subsidy were too low to
induce a farmer to engage in a renova-
tion, the result would also be inefficient.)
Defining the Best Clearing/
Planting Plan for Windbreak
Renovation
In order to evaluate alternative wind-
break renovation plans, we simulated the
costs and benefits associated with reno-
vating an existing quarter-mile, three-
row field windbreak—a typical northern
Great Plains windbreak. Our simulated
windbreak is 33 feet wide and occupies
an acre of land. In this analysis, we as-
sume that
 the old windbreak has declined to
75 percent of its mature height and
will become totally ineffective in
10 years from today; and
 a totally new windbreak or row of
trees within the windbreak, if
planted today, will become fully
effective in 10 years and will protect
the field for another 40 years there-
after.
Although uncertainty is an important
consideration in any investment deci-
sion, we conducted our analysis under
conditions of certainty (except for the
discount rate) to emphasize the trade-
offs that are involved. In our model, four
variables are of particular interest:
 the area of cropland protected,
 the cost of renovating the wind-
break,
 the yield increase that results from
crops being protected by the wind-
break, and
 the discount rate.
Based on assumptions (not reported
here) about windbreak structure and
farm crop rotation, we calculated the
cash flows associated with the various
windbreak clearing and planting sce-
narios shown in table 1. Our model
assumes crop yields increase in propor-
tion to the amount of protection they
receive from the windbreak. For ex-
ample, the yield of winter wheat per acre
is assumed to increase by 23 percent in
response to windbreak protection. A 10-
year average yield and a three-year
average market price of winter wheat
were used in the analysis. Crop market
prices were assumed to remain constant
at the current expected level over the
planning horizon (that is, crop prices are
assumed constant in real terms). The
costs of renovation activities were set at
the rates published by the Natural Re-
source Conservation Service. Cost-share
rates were taken from the EQIP program
in North Dakota. A real interest rate of
6.5 percent was used to reflect the
farmer’s real interest rate on a long-term
loan. And a real discount rate of 6.87
percent was used to calculate the present
value of the renovation cash flows. For




Of the 16 possible renovation plans
we examined, five are profitable (that is,
have positive NPVs), and 11 plans are
unprofitable, as shown in table 1, when
we include existing subsidies. All plans
are based on the existing three-row
windbreak described above. The three
profitable plans (those with the highest
NPVs) are:
 Clear no rows and plant no rows.
 Clear two rows and plant one row.
 Clear one row and plant one row.
Table 1 shows that renovation plans
that involve replanting multiple rows are
not as efficient as plans that call for re-
planting just a single row. The “clear no
rows and plant no rows” plan represents
an abandonment strategy where the
windbreak is left to deteriorate. The
other two plans (both consisting of par-
tial removal and replanting) are more
profitable than abandoning the wind-
break.
The best renovation plan when ac-
counting for existing subsidies, then, is
to clear two rows and plant one row.
This plan is better than abandonment,
which involves an opportunity cost of
land without providing crop benefits
because protection ceases with the useful
life of the existing windbreak. Interest-
ingly, the abandonment strategy is still
financially more attractive than renova-
tion plans that involve total clearing
(with no replanting) or replanting a mul-
tiple-row windbreak. The reason for this
is that abandonment delays the costs of
renovation and only incurs a gradually
increasing penalty (in terms of reduced
crop protection) as the windbreak ages—
even though clearing the windbreak
without replanting would bring more
land into production.
If the farmer replants more than a
single row, additional costs are incurred.
For example, the “clear two rows and
plant two rows” plan would lead to a
loss of $963 ($616 + $347). This reduc-
tion of profitability is one estimate of the
additional subsidy that society would
need to pay in order to induce this
farmer to replant two rows of trees when
removing old windbreaks.
Historically, the objective of cost-
share programs was to encourage
windbreak renovation by reducing the
initial cost of investing in windbreaks.
The relevant question is, are the cost-
share payments under current programs
sufficient to make up the cost of deviat-
ing from the farmer’s desired renovation
plan?
The relevant plan for this evaluation
of existing cost-share programs is not
the “clear two rows replant one row”
plan chosen above. To examine the ef-
fectiveness of existing subsides, we need
to compare them to the costs incurred by
deviating from the best plan when there
are no subsidies. Table 2 shows the NPV
of returns without a subsidy. For the
“clear two rows” option, the desired
plan, that is, the plan with the highest
NPV, is “replant zero rows.” To induce
the farmer to replant two rows (instead
replanting zero rows—the preferred
plan), the government would need to pay
him or her $2,389 ($147 + $2,242).
These subsidies appear to be sizable
when compared to the amount of money
a farmer can receive from current cost-
share programs. In table 3, we report the
present value of existing cost-share pay-
ments associated with alternative
renovation plans for our hypothetical
(See Windbreaks on page 6)6
Table 1. Only a few renovation plans are profitable, even after accounting for
cost-share payments (dollars per acre net present value)
Table 2. With no subsidies, replant zero rows is always the preferred option
(dollars per acre net present value)
Table 3. Existing cost-share payments (dollars per acre, present value)
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windbreak, and in figure 1 we diagram
these compared to the cost of alternative
renovation plans that involve replanting
0–3 rows of trees. For each planting
option, the “cost” shown is the amount
of money lost by following that plan
compared to the desired “replant zero
rows” plan.
Thus, we see, for example, that the
current level of cost-share payments are
just sufficient to induce replanting using
one-row windbreaks because the amount
of the cost-share payment just covers the
cost of deviating from the preferred
zero-replant plan. To the right of the
one-row planting point in figure 1, how-
ever, existing cost-share payments fall
short of covering the cost of deviating
from the efficient plan. The vertical dis-
tance between the two lines is the
“subsidy gap” (or surplus, for the one-
row option).
Although these results are based on a
model with several simplifying assump-
tions, the implications are clear. Under
the current cost-share program, field
windbreaks will continue to evolve to-
ward single-row plantings—even if
multiple-row renovation happens to be
more socially desirable.
No Subsidy, No Renovation
We started our research by assuming
that the profitability of windbreak reno-
vation is a function of the windbreak’s
initial condition, renovation cost, crop
yield response to protection, land saving,
and cost-share payments. Our analysis
shows that if replanting is at all profit-
able in such situations, a farmer is likely
to choose a single-row windbreak reno-
vation plan to replace an existing
multiple-row windbreak. This result
holds true even when a variety of alter-
native courses of action are considered.
Our results show that when farmers de-
cide to renovate a windbreak, two main
factors influence their decision; the in-
creased crop yields a windbreak
provides, and the amount of productive
land freed up by replanting fewer rows.
What do these results tell us about cost-
share programs?
Our analysis suggests that critical
windbreak renovation is not profitable
unless the farmer receives cost-share
payments. However, the existing cost-
share payments currently available to
Clear rows
Plant rows 0123
0 6 77 147 -3,445
1 -1,251 -1,201 -1,149 -3,990
2 -2,342 -2,292 -2,242 -5,084




1 1,163 1,373 1,496 1,548
2 1,270 1,480 1,626 1,679
3 1,991 2,202 2,348 2,400
Clear rows
Plant rows 0123
0 6 77 147 -3,445
1 -89 172 347 -2,442
2 -1,073 -812 -616 -3,405
3 -3,044 -2,784 -2,587 -5,3777
farmers are sufficient only to induce
renovations that use a single row of
trees. (A farmer, of course, may elect to
replace an existing windbreak with mul-
tiple rows, but that decision would likely
be motivated by considering other ben-
efits that are not reflected in our
investment profitability analysis.) Eco-
nomic logic also suggests that reno-
vation is more costly if the farmer waits
until the windbreak is at the end of its
useful life (and there is no remaining
protection value) because it takes time to
establish a replacement windbreak. A
dead windbreak is more likely to be
abandoned or cleared, and not replaced.
In conclusion, the cost-share pro-
grams currently in place may be
ineffective in sustaining the existing
multiple-row field windbreaks that we
find today across the northern Great
Plains.
Mamane Annou and Glenn Pederson are
former graduate research assistant and
professor, respectively, in the
Department of Applied Economics at the
University of Minnesota.
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